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The Bretton-Woods system, the post-war economic system premised on dollar 
convertibility, was both an economic arrangement and a political construct. Almost from the 
outset, the system strained. It nevertheless survived, as Barry Eichengreen has suggested, 
through an ‘interlocking web of political and economic bargains’.1 This article focuses on the 
John F. Kennedy administration and the transition to the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, 
a time when the system faced its first crisis.2 Rather than focus on the economic issues 
during that period, as many have already done, the article focuses on individuals principally 
the Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon and his role in garnering the political will that 
was necessary to sustain the system. Dillon exerted influence directly by liaising with key 
stakeholders in domestic and European financial circles and indirectly by winning over 
Kennedy to his economic views. Dillon moved Kennedy towards a more fiscally conservative 
position than his successor would later take. In turn, Kennedy’s perceived economic 
prudence was key to securing cooperation from European allies just as his successor’s 
perceived fiscal irresponsibility had the opposite effect. Unlike diplomatic historians who 
have largely focused their attention on inter-state relations, this article suggests that private 
actors were also important.3 Dillon and his Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs Robert 
Roosa were able to leverage their personal networks in European and US financial circles in 
order to secure the help of internationalist businessmen, most notably David Rockefeller, to 
great effect.  
By focusing on the bilateral relations between Treasury officials and their 
counterparts in Europe as well as their contacts in the private sector, the article provides a 
different lens under which to consider Eichengreen’s ‘bargains’. In so doing, it sheds light on 
the timing of France and others’ eventual challenge on the dollar’s role in international 
monetary relations. In addition, since Robert Roosa’s papers have yet to be processed by 
the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the article suggests that the topic of cooperation 
during the Bretton-Woods era remains a ripe area for research. Using newly-available 
presidential recordings, the full set of Douglas Dillon’s personal papers (including 
memoranda of his telephone conversations) and files from the Rockefeller archives, the 
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article sheds additional light on the Treasury Department’s role in sustaining the Bretton 
Woods system during tumultuous years. 
To date, the literature on cooperation during the Bretton-Woods era has focused 
relatively more on inter-state relations and especially on Franco-American relations. Most 
historians have suggested that French President de Gaulle’s opening salvo against dollar 
hegemony in February 1965 represented an ‘emotional bias’ towards his Anglo-Saxon 
rivals.4 For them, de Gaulle’s challenge on the dollar had political roots: as Frank Costigliola 
writes, ‘the disputes over political and military issues spilled over into economic relations.’5 
In reality, political and economic realities were indistinguishable. While these historians are 
correct in seeing escalation in Vietnam as an important trigger in de Gaulle’s challenge on 
US leadership, the problem was not the war itself but rather the economic implications of 
the war. The latter was seen as a symptom of President Johnson’s lack of economic 
discipline.6 Ignoring Dillon and Secretary of Defense McNamara’s warnings, Johnson 
demonstrated a largesse towards allies that they had not seen with Kennedy.7  
Finally, some historians have spoken about the salience of economic ideas and about 
the change in power balance within the French administration to explain the change in 
transatlantic cooperation on monetary issues in the Johnson administration. For them, the 
rise of the economist Jacques Rueff’s and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville’s influence on 
de Gaulle over more Atlanticist officials such as Wilfrid Baumgmartner and his successor as 
Minister of Finance, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was a significant variable.8 In fact, as John 
Odell has shown, a shift in power occurred in the United States as well, with Dillon’s 
relegation from a preeminent to a secondary role in the transition from Kennedy to Johnson 
and eventually with his and Roosa’s replacement with Henry Fowler and Frederick Deming 
respectively. Mirroring explanations for the French shift, Odell claims that the change in 
personnel was important because it signalled that Robert Triffin’s views on the Bretton 
Woods system, that were more radical than Dillon and Roosa’s, were on the ascendant.9 
The article builds on Odell’s work insofar as he rejects that changes in monetary 
policy during this time were ‘explainable as an acquiescence to international market 
pressures as conceived in conventional theory’, in other words by impersonal forces, or by 
domestic pressures. As he does, the research here suggests that agents, President Kennedy, 
Dillon and Roosa, were important. Whereas for Odell agents were only important insofar as 
they carried with them ideas on reforming the international monetary system, here the 
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suggestion is made that actors were important in their own right as stabilizing forces. 
Similarly, the article adds to Erin Mahan and Francis Gavin’s work that shows that France 
was remarkably cooperative on economic issues and was not a knee-jerk challenger to US 
hegemony.10 It adds private actors to the list of ‘challengers’. The article makes a first step 
towards filling a gap in the existing literature on the role of private actors during this period. 
There is a dearth of works on the Kennedy administration’s relations with the business 
community although many in the administration were more concerned about Wall Street 
than they were about European allies.11  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Dillon at the Treasury Department 
Dillon was a revealing choice as Secretary of Treasury. He began his career at his father’s 
investment bank Dillon, Read & Co. and only reluctantly took on its Chairmanship after 
wartime service.12 The bank was at the centre of the revolving door between government 
and business: its alumni included Paul Nitze and the first US Secretary of Defense James 
Forrestal. Instead of banking however, Dillon preferred a career in government and swiftly 
left banking to join the Eisenhower administration where he served as Ambassador to 
France and then Undersecretary of State for Economic affairs. In the latter role, Dillon’s 
views echoed Kennedy’s campaign messages. In particular, he became an advocate for a 
‘substantially increased economic aid’ program in the ‘less developed areas’ of the world, 
which he thought would become ‘the principal battlefield in the Cold War’.13 Despite 
rhetorical similarities with the Democrat candidate however, Dillon was a staunch 
Republican. He had campaigned for Republican candidates in each election since 1948 and 
had been a major donor to the Richard Nixon campaign.14  
Dillon’s privileged upbringing and career gave him access to a powerful network in 
business around the world. In his oral histories for the Kennedy Presidential Library, Dillon 
recounted how he had known the Chairman of the Federal Reserve William McChesney 
Martin ‘for some 25 years, long before he ever came to work for the government’, how the 
influential columnist Joseph Alsop was an ‘old friend of mine in boarding school and college’ 
(as were the Rockefeller brothers), how Senator William Fulbright was a ‘very good friend’ 
and how he had maintained cordial relations with de Gaulle during the General’s wilderness 
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years.15 This bipartisan network was a key selling point for his candidacy at the head of the 
Treasury. 
 In appointing Dillon to the position, Kennedy insisted that his choice was without 
political calculations. In their first joint press conference, the President-elect explained that 
for positions that touched upon the national security of the United States, ‘I have attempted 
to secure the best people available in the United States regardless of their party – men who 
are united by a common determination to see […] our strength increased.’ Dillon explained 
how ‘the maintenance of fiscal stability of the United States is an essential element of our 
national security,’ that his was an apolitical position. He added, the ‘strength of the whole 
free world is tied with the strength of the dollar, and the fiscal stability of the United States.’ 
When asked how he felt about joining a ‘cabinet full of Democrats’, Dillon laughed the 
suggestion off, adding, ‘I wouldn’t be the only one, Mr. McNamara is with me in that 
position.’16 
However, Dillon and Kennedy’s insistence on ‘fiscal stability’ during their press 
conference was a not so subtle indication that actually, Dillon was a political appointment 
designed specifically to reassure Republicans and allies that their fears of a profligate 
Democrat president were unfounded. During the election, the price of gold had shot up 
against worries that Kennedy might devalue. In a series of letters to then-Senator Kennedy, 
the economist John Kenneth Galbraith warned that for the first year since the creation of 
the Bretton-Woods system, foreign claims on dollars now exceeded the country’s gold 
reserves and that the incoming President needed to send a clear message to actors that 
might provoke a run on the dollar.17 Kennedy did so in a speech delivered in Philadelphia in 
October 1960.  
Also, his transition team, which included Paul Nitze, recommended a Treasury 
Secretary ‘who enjoys high respect and confidence in the international financial world’ and 
ideally had previous experience in State. Richard Neustadt narrowed the candidates down 
the list to Robert Lovett, John McCloy and Dillon. He admitted that the administration would 
probably end up with a Republican, which would provide the ‘symbolisms of bipartisanship 
and fiscal responsibility rolled into one.’18 A separate McKinsey study agreed. It explained 
that the Secretary’s main role was to be a spokesperson to Congress and financial interests, 
which tended to be overwhelmingly Republican.19 
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The bipartisan and reassuring choice of Dillon was not without its detractors. While 
Galbraith might have been ‘euphorically insistent’, and Dillon’s old friend Joe Alsop ‘equally 
impassioned’ about Dillon, others were concerned.20 Robert Kennedy speculated that he 
could later resign loudly and embarrass the administration.21 Arthur Schlesinger worried 
that someone like Dillon would scuttle liberal dreams. He wrote, ‘The gold crisis makes 
Treasury especially critical, since the orthodox answer would be to reduce public spending 
and increase the interest rate, and the crisis would therefore reinforce all Dillon’s natural 
inclinations.’22 Senator Albert Gore, who had campaigned with Kennedy against 
Eisenhower’s conservative economic policies, was especially furious.23 ‘Such an 
appointment,’ he warned, ‘would be a signal that you have given up the goals of a truly 
Democratic Administration.’24 Gore also warned that Dillon would skew the administration’s 
policy, pushing an ‘ultra-conservative policy wrapped up with pseudonyms and labels to 
make it appear as liberal policy.’25 
 To some extent, Gore was correct. Much as Dillon played up his conversion to 
Keynesianism in office, he continued to encourage fiscal conservatism as he emerged as a 
key advisor to Kennedy. Kennedy’s other economic advisors bemoaned the fact that Dillon 
had ‘the greatest influence on economic policy of all Cabinet members’ and indeed that he 
carried such weight ‘beyond economics and finance’ as the President and he became 
particularly close.26 As news reports at the time noted, to some extent Dillon’s positions on 
economic issues were a reflection of the Treasury Department itself, a ‘big and bureaucratic, 
banker-oriented and debt conscious’ institution, but it also reflected Dillon’s personal take 
on the problems confronting the United States, a view he shared with the President.27 
 As Galbraith had intimated during the campaign, the start of the Kennedy 
administration coincided with the first period after the war during which the United States 
felt a tension between its domestic ambitions and its global responsibilities. Despite the 
administration’s best efforts to encourage trade, overseas operations and foreign access to 
American capital produced a persistent balance of payments deficit. This was a result of 
government actions and of private capital outflows. Yet in the face of a lagging domestic 
economy, the administration could not increase interest rates. Robert Triffin, the Yale 
economist, gave his name to this core dilemma: to resolve the balance of payments, the 
United States should have increased interest rates but as a reserve currency, it could not do 
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this without also choking off liquidity that was necessary for growth at home and in allied 
economies in the absence of alternative capital markets abroad. 
 As a result, Dillon and Roosa went to work with Allies on a number of short-term 
steps alongside secret longer-term planning for ‘corrective action’ including studying 
alternatives to the dollar-gold peg.28 Roosa played a central part in flagship steps, including 
in the so-called ‘Roosa bonds’ that were denominated in foreign currencies; in the creation 
of a London gold pool that was designed to buffer against changes in the price of gold and in 
strengthening the IMF’s contingency arrangements.29 In addition, Dillon pressured other 
government departments – chiefly the Defense Department - to reduce overseas outlays 
and to pressure Allies to ‘offset’ dollar costs of US operations. He became the public face of 
the Interest Equalization Tax (IET), which de facto taxed foreign access to US capital by 
taxing US investors’ foreign securities purchases. Critics, which included Triffin, derided 
these as mere ‘palliative’ actions but nevertheless subsequently accepted that they 
‘postponed the day [of reckoning] longer than I would have expected.’30 
 In Dillon’s correspondence with President Kennedy, what is remarkable is how much 
of this cooperation remained secret to even senior members of the administration and how 
many internal debates Dillon won. He overruled the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and 
other economic experts on virtually all main economic points of contention, including the 
timing and pace of the tax cut bill and in delaying public works spending. During a key 
Cabinet-wide discussion on the balance of payments in September 1963, Dillon and 
Galbraith dominated the discussion.31 Throughout this period, where the more academic 
economists in the CEA recommended a wholesale reform of the Bretton-Woods system, 
Dillon argued that preserving confidence was critical, that reform would work only after the 
United States had begun to tackle its balance of payments problems. In July 1961, for 
instance, Triffin suggested creating a ‘super-central bank for creating international 
monetary reserves.’32 Dillon dismissed this idea, arguing that ‘our feelings were based on 
practicality.’33 Similarly, when Triffin’s colleague from Yale, James Tobin who was now in the 
CEA, suggested a ‘floating dollar free of gold’, it provoked laughter.34  
 Similarly, Dillon frequently overruled the State Department despite saying that his 
experiences there as Undersecretary under the economic stringency of the Eisenhower 
administration had made him very conscious of departmental prerogatives.35 When Walt 
Rostow recommended that Kennedy devalue and expressed anger at plans to withdraw 
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troops from Europe, Dillon commented, ‘This philosophy is the natural reaction of those 
who find their preferred policies threatened by balance of payments difficulties.’36 But 
Dillon had powerful allies as he pushed for troop reductions and other policies aimed at 
redressing the balance of payments deficit.  They included McNamara and Galbraith. 
Brushing aside State’s focus on ‘semantics’, McNamara suggested to Dillon, ‘We shouldn’t 
try to be too fancy with the Germans and the French and pretend that our balance of 
payments didn’t have anything to do at all with this.’37 Similarly, in pushing for offset 
agreements, Dillon and McNamara won over Kennedy despite objections from the State 
Department that such agreements might weaken the perceived US commitment to Allies. 
 Dillon was able to overrule the CEA and the State Department by convincing 
President Kennedy that securing business and Allied confidence was of first importance. 
Liberal critics such as Gore expressed anger at this focus on ‘acceptance in the financial 
community, both international and national, in order to bolster and preserve the confidence 
in the dollar, confidence in the stability of economic policies.’ He equated this position as 
‘notice to the world that you are going to follow the same policies that Eisenhower 
followed.’38 Kennedy publicly dismissed the ‘myth’ of confidence, notably in the Yale 
Commencement speech in June 1962.39 Yet, in private, he accepted his Secretary’s position 
that securing confidence was a sine qua non condition for other domestic economic 
programs and for Allies’ willingness to countenance reform of the economic system. 
For Dillon and Roosa, confidence was only possible by ‘avoid[ing] any public 
expression of undue concern over the gold situations inasmuch as the concern might in 
itself stimulate capital flight’ and, as Gore feared, by demonstrating fiscal prudence.40 Not 
long after the Berlin crisis in September 1961 that had triggered gold hoarding and a further 
crisis with the British pound in October, Dillon wrote to Kennedy: ‘The amount of this loss 
will depend on how much of their dollar gains foreigners will decide to keep in dollar 
balances instead of requesting gold. This in turn will depend on the general state of 
confidence in our overall financial situation which has clearly declined in recent months. To 
get the trend moving in the right direction again, it is highly important that a strong effort 
be made to keep the Government’s budget deficit this fiscal year as low as possible through 
substantial administrative reductions in civilian spending.’41 Dillon repeatedly told the 
President that long-term reforms to the international monetary system that might make the 
United States more resilient were only possible by first securing confidence in the 
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Democratic President’s financial responsibility. He wrote, ‘We have got to get our own 
deficit really well in hand before any of the continental people will be ready for any earth-
shaking new thing.’42  
In addition, Dillon and Roosa used their networks and clout in the private sector and 
with Europeans to produce secret back channels.43 For Dillon, their secret meetings with 
European central bankers and government officials were a ‘substantial element in the 
relative strength of the dollar’.44 His correspondence with Kennedy is replete with 
references to these ‘secret’ and ‘very quiet’ contacts.45 Later, Roosa ascribed his own need 
for secrecy to his time at the Federal Reserve that had ‘left me with more than a trace of the 
preference for secrecy and aloofness that has necessarily become traditional in that 
fraternity.’46 
However, what is not clear from their correspondence is whether Kennedy was 
predisposed to agree with Dillon in the first place. In his oral history, Dillon argued that 
Kennedy chose him because they agreed on economic policy. He explained, ‘He was afraid 
that there was a lack of confidence in the US and that nobody knew what the new policies 
would be. He said that I could render substantial assistance because I was known in Europe 
and was known to believe in the maintenance of the value of the dollar and in a sound 
dollar, which he very much believed in himself.’47 Schlesinger saw Kennedy’s father’s 
influence in this. ‘The elder Kennedy had in particular the business belief in the mystique of 
“confidence” and used to warn against action or appointments which might impair that 
sacred commodity,’ he wrote. Many colleagues were surprised if not disappointed by 
Kennedy’s inclination to follow the business world’s preferred line on fiscal policy.48 
By contrast, Kennedy’s successor was far less fiscally conservative and far more aloof 
in his relations with Dillon. Within days of Kennedy’s assassination, Dillon wrote to Johnson 
about market turbulence and suggested a reassuring passage for Johnson’s first address to 
the nation.49 Johnson used just ten words. Diplomatically, Dillon recalled that Johnson ‘had 
very little interest that I could see, in substance. He may have had it internally, but it never 
came out.’50 Instead, the day of Kennedy’s funeral, Johnson set a different tone. Schlesinger 
noted: ‘He has assured [Walter] Heller and Galbraith that he is a Roosevelt Democrat, not 
an Eisenhower Democrat; that he always felt Kennedy to be unduly conservative on fiscal 
questions; and that he plans to continue and enlarge Kennedy’s social and economic 
programs.’51 Even as Dillon continued to champion the Kennedy tax cut, which Johnson 
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would also speak to in his first speech, he reminded the President that expenditure control 
was crucial to placate conservative and business fears.52 
 The problem too was that Johnson and his new entourage seemed to ad lib on 
carefully constructed policies. In December 1963, when Johnson expanded on the country’s 
commitment to keep six divisions in West Germany, Dillon was furious.53 He wrote about 
the ‘importance of this matter from a balance of payments point of view’ and of the 
‘psychological effects of our posture on European Finance Ministers and Central Banks’ and 
reminded the President of the ‘significant domestic political issue involved.’54 A few months 
later, Dillon worked with Johnson’s assistant Bill Moyers to articulate a press line on the 
balance of payments, only to find his advice ignored.55 Johnson regularly fielded Dillon’s 
calls who complained that when the President called for a cabinet meeting on economic 
issues, it was ‘just a publicity stunt.’56  
Dillon’s frustration with Johnson continued to grow into the spring of 1965 when he 
finally left. In early 1965, when the President made a suggestion about devaluation that 
landed in the Wall Street Journal, Dillon seethed: ‘We have been talking about this for a year 
and a half; that certainly no suggestion involving a change in the price of gold is acceptable 
or proper.’57 Just days before de Gaulle’s February 1965 press conference, he wrote to 
White House staff, ‘For god’s sake tell everyone not to talk about this problem […] Talk 
makes everything worse.’58 In conversations with his colleagues, he complained about the 
President’s thin skin and lack of diligence on economic issues. In one phone conversation, 
McGeorge Bundy told Dillon how ‘[CIA Director] McCone said he thought […] the President 
was basically usurping [the Treasury’s role] – he thought we ought to stand up to him.’59 But 
without direct access to the President, Dillon was ignored. 
 Ultimately, Johnson refused to heed Dillon’s advice that his political largesse had 
potentially catastrophic economic consequences and that political cooperation from Allies 
also relied on a series of economic understandings that Dillon had carefully negotiated. A 
deficit was acceptable to them ‘as long as it didn’t stay too long,’ he warned.60 Whereas 
Kennedy had considered increasing taxes in the wake of the Berlin crisis, Johnson refused to 
do so as the US commitment to South Vietnam began to escalate. Unlike Kennedy, Johnson 
did not share European and conservative concerns about balancing the budget and the 
potential danger of exporting inflation. He was also less willing to adopt or adjust to their 
views. With Dillon’s departure from government, Johnson ultimately lost someone who 
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could defend the more conservative view and, with him, access to a well-developed 
network with the same actors that might precipitate a run on the dollar, especially in France 
and the American banking community. 
 
French monetary cooperation 
The extensive literature on French monetary cooperation to date has largely focused on a 
philosophical shift within French government about the role of the dollar in the mid-1960s. 
Mahan and Gavin, in particular, have focused on the ascent of Rueff and Prime Minister 
Debré’s anger with American ‘easy money’ and its willingness to export inflation onto 
international dollar holders.61 While de Gaulle’s February 1965 speech emphasized these 
structural concerns and the economic dominance that came from the dollar’s central role 
under the Bretton-Woods system as opposed to a more ‘neutral’ gold standard, he also 
reflected on the long-standing cooperation that existed. In his speech, the General spoke of 
the extensive consultative mechanisms and of overdue and ‘preventative’ action that should 
be undertaken in a ‘serene’ atmosphere.62 
Mahan has shown that France was overwhelmingly cooperative in the early part of 
the decade: before 1962, France was one of the few countries that did not convert its dollar 
reserves into gold.63 If anyone, it was Britain that was chastised for its ‘totally different 
attitude from that of the Central Bankers on the continent.’64 Kennedy only began to 
complain about the French on monetary issues in 1963. However, even then, Roosa urged 
the President to see matters from France’s perspective arguing that they ‘really think 
they’ve given enough already’ and in particular to consider his ally Giscard d’Estaing who 
was ‘being made a scapegoat’.65 Despite some tensions, the American and French positions 
were never wildly off during Kennedy’s time as both sides agreed on the threat that a 
continued balance of payments deficit posed to the international monetary system. 
Moreover, Dillon and Roosa regularly extended diplomatic gestures to de Gaulle and to his 
closest advisors, many of whom were long-time friends. This was no longer true after Roosa 
and Dillon left the Johnson administration, in January and April 1965 respectively. 
Yet, although Dillon and de Gaulle had known each other for some time, whatever 
warmth they might have had evaporated when Dillon came to the Treasury Department. As 
Ambassador to France, Dillon, whose family owned a reputed Bordeaux vineyard, had been 
well-regarded by the Gaullists. He consulted de Gaulle during the latter’s years out of 
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government and befriended the then-Senator Debré. Later, as Undersecretary of State, 
Dillon accompanied de Gaulle and his wife for the duration of their trip to the United States 
in April 1960. In thanking him, de Gaulle wrote of Dillon’s ‘thoughtfulness and friendship’ 
and expressed his ‘high esteem’.66 However, their ‘friendship’ did not make Dillon more 
sympathetic to the French President once he was at the Treasury. Even after de Gaulle’s 
1965 press conference, Dillon minimized the General’s importance suggesting flattery would 
placate him and that the United States would be best served if it ‘operate[d] on the 
assumption that de Gaulle’s leadership of France is temporary.’67 Dillon’s more recent 
experience at the Treasury working with his French counterparts at the Ministry of Finance 
encouraged his view that de Gaulle was a temporary, and surmountable, obstacle to 
cooperation.  
Throughout his time in office, Dillon’s working relationship with Atlanticists at the 
Ministry of Finance was able to keep Rueff’s influence in check and largely dictated the tone 
of Franco-American monetary cooperation. Baumgartner and his successor as Minister of 
Finance, Giscard ensured cooperation and largely bypassed de Gaulle. Dillon addressed both 
men as ‘my dear friend’ and maintained a secret channel of communication with them 
through Ambassador James Gavin.68 As he would in every other period of tension, when de 
Gaulle felt spurned by bilateral talks between UK Prime Minister Macmillan and Kennedy in 
May 1961, Dillon rushed to ‘correct this feeling’ and invited Baumgartner to spend time with 
him in Washington.69 Despite initial concerns over Giscard, Dillon found him no less 
cooperative. On his visits to Paris, on the margins of OECD, IMF or NATO meetings, he 
dedicated an unusual amount of time to Giscard.70 
 Until 1963, the Finance Ministry actively kept de Gaulle in the dark over international 
monetary affairs. In the lead-up to Kennedy’s visit to France in May 1961, Baumgartner and 
Dillon agreed to leave technical matters ‘in the hands of the financial experts of our two 
governments’ noting that de Gaulle was just ‘generally aware’ of the problems.71 The Bank 
of France cooperated in hiding relevant information from the President. In one secret 
meeting with Dillon in May 1962, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, Pierre Calvet, 
told Dillon that de Gaulle was ‘not well aware’ that a third of its foreign exchange assets 
were held in dollars and despite tentative enquiries from the Elysée Palace, the ‘Bank of 
France was not anxious to give him detailed information and so far has not done so.’72 
Although the French economic authorities regularly warned that these dollars ‘represented 
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a political as well as an economic problem’, and despite their regular gold purchases, they 
nevertheless went out of their way to reassure Dillon that they did not wish to undermine 
cooperation.73 
 For his part, Dillon was also more inclined to make concessions to the French, 
including on defense matters and notably on nuclear issues. Throughout 1962, American 
officials tried to encourage their French counterparts to buy more American military goods 
or to enter into a similar ‘offset’ arrangement as they were negotiating with the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Costigliola and others have quoted the memorable quip from one 
French official, ‘You don’t want to sell us what we want to buy,’ that is, nuclear 
technology.74 However, what emerges from Dillon’s documents is how far he, McNamara, 
McCone and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Taylor, were willing to 
countenance helping the French, if not on their nuclear program itself, on the associated 
equipment.75 In one conversation, McNamara suggested to Dillon that the President ‘agreed 
with him’ but it was the State Department who scuttled his plans.76 
 Transatlantic exchanges between economic authorities during this period provide 
another insight into the timing of de Gaulle’s challenge on the dollar’s role in the 
international monetary system. Despite Dillon and Giscard’s best efforts, as well as 
Kennedy’s rhetorical nods to transatlantic cooperation most notably in his January 1963 
State of the Union address, the Kennedy administration became concerned about de 
Gaulle’s anti-American positions. Dillon assured Kennedy that de Gaulle would not risk 
‘destroy[ing] the whole system of international cooperation in the monetary, financial and 
other spheres’, but nevertheless told the President that ‘we should have a plan for this.’77 
Still, and amid calls from the Foreign Ministry to take a tougher stand on the dollar, Giscard 
brokered compromises with his American ‘friend’ into 1964, including by pushing forward 
prepayments on US loans. 
 Even as French pressure ratcheted up, the cooperative channels between Treasury 
departments continued to make a difference. In part, this was because the US Treasury’s 
position overlapped with the French one on core issues including the type of action that 
might be needed to tackle the balance of payments and the excessive role of US capital on 
European economies. Returning from Europe in December 1961, Roosa applauded the 
‘complete agreement on the impelling need for the United States to regain balance of 
payments equilibrium.’78 With a sympathetic President under Kennedy, Dillon led a Cabinet 
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Committee charged with tacking the deficit and leveraged the White House’s pressure. In 
March 1963, Kennedy asked the committee if the country was doing enough to convince 
Europeans to hold their dollars, to which the Treasury responded that if the ‘present level 
[continued] beyond two years,’ it ‘would not be sustainable.’79 In particular, Dillon echoed 
Giscard’s concern that the United States might export inflation if it did not keep its budget 
under control.80 
A further concern for France was the inflow of American capital, which began to take 
on nationalist undertones. Whereas the French had courted American capital in earlier 
years, by 1963 they were running a trade surplus and began to express concern about the 
economic dominance it represented. The issue took on a symbolic importance in the second 
half of the decade, with the publication of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s Le Défi 
Américain that decried American capitalism as a form of colonization and with de Gaulle 
himself describing the situation as ‘expropriation’ during his February 1965 press 
conference. However, in the Kennedy administration, the concern over capital flows was 
especially pronounced on the US side as they represented a further dollar drain. The 
Chrysler takeover of the French automobile company Simca later became a lightning rod for 
French opposition to American capital but in 1963, it was Kennedy that used it as an 
example of the type of foreign operations that could also harm the United States’ economic 
standing.81 The administration pressed Europeans to develop their own capital markets and, 
when that failed, passed the IET which essentially taxed international transactions. 
With the IET and other concrete policies, including on trade, that addressed the 
balance of payments problem, the Kennedy administration attempted to placate French 
concerns. In June 1963, after a phone conversation with Giscard, Dillon noted that he 
‘closed by saying they were pleased with the trend in the American economy.’82 Well into 
1964, as the steps initiated in the Kennedy administration began to take effect, the 
Europeans seemed on board. In May 1964, Dillon found European central and commercial 
bankers ‘much impressed by the improvement in the United States’ balance of payments’ 
even as they continued to worry about a ‘relapse’ and its ‘extremely serious consequences 
for the dollar and for the world in general.’83 Roosa reassured his IMF partners that ‘never 
again’ would the United States ‘be slow to realize the payments problems as in 1958-60.’84  
Whereas Roosa’s comment might have been true under Kennedy, under Johnson the 
mood began to change. By 1966, without assurances of fiscal discipline nor the prospect of 
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budgetary balance, de Gaulle privately confessed, ‘We must wait for the collapse of the 
dollar. The Americans spend too much on Vietnam, research, and space for their own good. 
We shall be forced to cover the American deficit. They will take up a collection and our 
partners will give in to American influence.’85 There is no way of knowing if Kennedy’s 
policies would have been enough to continue to secure French cooperation nor even if 
Kennedy would have, or indeed could have, continued to be as fiscally conservative as he 
had been. Nevertheless, behind the façade of continuity in the transition from the Kennedy 
to Johnson administrations and, as de Gaulle discerned, a shift occurred. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Business and the administration 
The Kennedy administration was ultimately more concerned with the business world, and 
Republican Wall Street in particular, than it was with de Gaulle. From the administration’s 
vantage point, ‘business’ was less inclined to cooperation and had more of a political 
incentive to provoke a run on the dollar. In some respects, the early 1960s were a coming of 
age moment for Wall Street as capital flows became increasingly internationalized and fluid. 
Bankers such as David Rockefeller at Chase Manhattan Bank became true global bankers: in 
the absence of alternative sources of capital abroad, they built up a strong presence around 
the world and especially in Europe.86 By 1969, close to a quarter of Chase’s portfolio was 
abroad. In keeping with its global reach, Chase Manhattan created an International Advisory 
Committee that would eventually gather some of the foremost public figures of the time, 
including Dillon, Baumgartner and future Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.87 However, most 
of these overseas operations also represented a drain on the balance of payments and one 
that seemed less amenable to a diplomatic solution.  
In 1960 and for much of the Kennedy administration, a general climate of distrust 
poisoned relations between business and the administration. Reiterating similar warnings 
from Roosa and Galbraith, Dillon wrote to Kennedy that the ‘biggest danger is not from 
abroad, the big danger is the Americans’ who might provoke a run on the dollar.88 American 
businessmen were also more explicit in essentially blackmailing the administration and tying 
their cooperation to a quid pro quo on fiscal discipline. Much as Galbraith dismissed the 
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bankers as ‘on the whole, egotistical reactionaries’ who were stuck in ‘their always myopic 
and often medieval instincts,’ the administration nevertheless worked to reassure them.89 
 The administration started afoul with the business world. In part, it was a question of 
form: whereas President Eisenhower’s appointments had included 36% businessmen, 
Kennedy’s only included six.90 In lieu of Eisenhower’s Cabinet of ‘eight millionaires and a 
plumber’, Kennedy’s was filled with East Coast intellectuals. Moreover, business fears began 
to translate into economic outcomes. In April 1962, tensions flared when the steel industry 
broke with official price guidelines aimed at stemming inflation, and in May of the same 
year, a stock market crash ended the administration’s plans for a balanced budget.  
Both sides blamed each other for the stock market’s fall. Bankers blamed Kennedy’s 
anti-business streak; the administration attacked the bankers’ ill-will towards the 
administration. Years later, Dillon suggested that Kennedy had been ‘treated fairly by 
everyone with the big exception of the business community.’91 In June 1962, speaking to the 
Financial Writers Association, Dillon struck a tone that spoke to his previous incarnation as a 
financier. The speech became a template for all of the administration’s speeches thereafter 
and especially for Kennedy’s Yale Commencement speech. ‘Panic took control of the great 
NYSE,’ Dillon explained, and expectations - ‘the mirage of imminent inflation’ – overtook 
reality. He attacked the ‘myth’ that government deficits necessarily produced inflation and 
suggested the crash was the product of a misunderstanding. He noted, ‘Another myth that 
has been current in business circles in recent months is the misconception that the Kennedy 
administration is pursuing an overall anti-business policy.’92 It became Dillon’s role to 
correct this misconception. 
 Writing during the steel crisis, a former partner at Dillon, Read & Co., wrote to Dillon 
asking him to ‘do your best’ to remove the ‘semblance of a fight between the administration 
and ‘business’.’93 This was an uphill battle: one poll suggested that fifty-two percent of 
businessmen felt the administration was ‘strongly anti-business’, thirty-six percent 
‘moderately’ so, and only nine percent felt the administration was either neutral or pro-
business.94 In the face of these alarming poll numbers, Dillon sent Kennedy a study prepared 
at the Treasury Department that suggested that the ‘president’s popularity seemed to be 
very high’ but that ‘attacks were directed toward the “wild-eyed men” around’ him.95 Early 
efforts to change this perception backfired. In his journals, Schlesinger angrily noted, ‘There 
are about ten thousand people in the country involved in this – bankers, industrialists, 
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lawyers, publishers, politicians – a small group but doing everything they can to say that we 
are going into a depression because business has no confidence in the administration.’96  
As Schlesinger noted, the financial press toed the business line as well. Instead of 
Dillon, Time Magazine put the Chairman of the CEA and the quintessential New Frontier 
intellectual, Walter Heller on its front page with an ominous chart of a collapsing market as 
a backdrop.97 The Wall Street Journal, in particular, was biting in its criticism of the 
administration and became a mouthpiece for conservative criticism. Its op-eds were 
especially critical on the issue of a tax cut. One read: ‘Tax cutting is not at all the surest and 
soundest way to a balanced budget; that way is to reduce the spending. […] The Kennedy 
tax program may be fine by itself, but the Government’s financial policy as a whole cannot 
honestly be called responsible.’98 Dillon, who forwarded pertinent media reporting to the 
President, appended one favourable Wall Street Journal article with a note that read, ‘Mr. 
President, To be framed for posterity. It may never happen again.’99 
In the face of this resistance, Kennedy centralized control over the administration’s 
economic message and sent Dillon on a peacebuilding mission as someone who ‘could talk 
as a businessman’.100 He instructed his colleagues, ‘I don’t want anyone to say anything 
about the domestic economy except for Doug Dillon and myself.’101 As the administration’s 
envoy to the business world, Dillon got to work reaching out to friends including Thomas 
Watson Jr. at IBM and the former Secretary of Defense and banker Robert Lovett, who had 
initially been offered the Treasury job. He resuscitated the Business Advisory Committee 
whose ‘lunches and informal gatherings’, he explained to Robert Kennedy, went some way 
to building up a ‘reservoir of good will and understanding’.102 
Dillon’s role as envoy was perhaps most important on the issue of tax reduction and 
the administration’s key ally from Wall Street on this issue was David Rockefeller. Dillon 
influenced the public relations aspects of the tax cut and also its timing. Significantly, the 
first tax cut that passed during the Kennedy administration was a change to depreciation 
rules, which essentially allowed businesses to lower their operating costs. The broader 
program of income tax reduction was delayed in light of ‘other policy considerations’.103 By 
1962, Dillon agreed with Galbraith and others that a tax cut was good policy and could give 
the economy precisely the kind of boost that it needed. However, he had also won over the 
President and Galbraith to his view that the CEA’s ‘more extreme measures’ should be held 
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off at least until after the mid-term elections in order to ‘not frighten the financial 
groups’.104 
In January 1963, Kennedy and Dillon launched a charm offensive aimed at reassuring 
European and domestic audiences about the tax cut. In his State of the Union address, 
Kennedy emphasized the strength of transatlantic cooperation on monetary issues and 
explained how the tax cut was a necessary step to kick-start the domestic economy in order 
to reduce the budget deficit. He reiterated his underlying objective of attaining budgetary 
balance once the economy was performing as it should. To the IMF, Dillon repeatedly 
emphasized the ‘firmness of [the administration’s] decision’ to balance the budget as soon 
as feasible contrary to the line ‘some of our financial press and banking community have 
been peddling.’105 
 Throughout 1963, Dillon and Kennedy took a more pedagogical approach in order to 
sell the tax cut and its underlying economic principles. Speaking to the American Bankers 
Symposium on Economic Growth in February 1963, Kennedy ‘hope[d] that all groups would 
put the national interest first’ as he explained that a tax cut could be beneficial for ‘fiscal 
responsibility, equity and efficiency – but above all, [would be] in the interest of economic 
growth.’ As bankers, he told them, they should ‘understand better than most people that 
debt’ could be undertaken ‘for gainful purposes’.106 Nonetheless, the President repeated 
that ‘everything hangs on us, everything hangs upon our maintaining our economy 
effectively and maintaining […] discipline.’107 
As he did with the French, Dillon encouraged the view that the administration was 
fiscally conservative in order to stave off a possible attack on the dollar and in order to 
coopt businesspeople and thus congressmen to the administration’s line. In their speeches, 
he and Kennedy sought to ‘placate fears concerning deficit spending and inflationary 
tendencies.’108 Dillon reassured audiences that the deficits were only for a ‘brief transitional 
period’ and that the ‘President has emphatically committed’ to ‘a course of intensive 
expenditure control.’109 He emphasized that civilian expenditures had largely been limited 
to defense and space, the type of spending they might be more inclined to support. 
 As part of its public relations efforts, the administration also set up a Business 
Committee for Tax Reduction. The committee included major business figures most notably 
its Chairmen Henry Ford II, the railway scion Stuart Saunders and its Vice-Chairman David 
Rockefeller. Recognizing that ‘tax credit has all the sex appeal of a 300lb. grandmother’, the 
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administration used these men to advance their message to others in the business world 
and in the key congressional committees, including the Senate Finance Committee and the 
House Ways and Means Committee.110 
In some respects, Rockefeller was the most important and interesting of all. Dillon’s 
long-standing relationship with the Rockefeller brothers had continued in his time in 
government. During the Eisenhower administration, John D. Rockefeller had corresponded 
with Dillon about creating public-private partnerships to address international development 
needs.111 In the Kennedy administration, David Rockefeller had expressed a similar interest 
with respect to Latin America. He ultimately became a flagbearer for Dillon’s bridge-building 
efforts on tax as well as the balance of payments. To be fair, he was predisposed to this role 
before Dillon came calling. He was an internationalist and intellectual businessman who 
championed ideas about responsible business. In a speech, he explained that ‘one of the 
foremost tasks we shall face in the future is the building of sufficiently competent, broad-
gauged and imaginative leaders of business’ who ‘feel a responsibility to society which goes 
beyond the maximizing of profits for their shareholders.’112 Elsewhere, he wrote that ‘the 
businessman still must learn to communicate more effectively with several groups, 
foremost among them his opposite numbers in labor and government.’113  
He was able to put his ideas to practice during the Kennedy administration. At a 
dinner held in French Culture Minister André Malraux’s honor, the President asked 
Rockefeller for his views on the administration’s economic policy. Within weeks, Rockefeller 
obliged with his insight, including the point that the United States could not ‘have our cake 
and eat it too – that taxes can be reduced even while the government expenditures 
increase.’ He added, ‘bankers here and abroad look with concern on recent fiscal policy in 
our country and worry actively about the future of the dollar’ even while he applauded the 
Treasury ‘for thinking ahead’.114  
About three weeks later, in a letter drafted by Dillon, Kennedy replied. On the 
balance of payments problems, Kennedy emphasised the need for cooperation: ‘we know 
we cannot solves this problem alone – and other free nations know that they, too, cannot 
afford any weakness in the dollar, which is the very foundation of the international 
monetary system.’115 In a nod to the more conservative sub-text of Rockefeller’s letter, he 
pressed the need for a tax cut while emphasizing that it ‘does not, however, diminish the 
need for strict control of budget expenditures – and I have found it desirable to trim the 
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budget request of various departments and agents by several billion dollars each year.’116 In 
other words, Kennedy was not the fiscally irresponsible bogeyman that bankers imagined. 
 Although the exchange was initially private, Dillon saw in it an opportunity to 
showcase constructive dialogue between the administration and business. In a phone 
conversation with Dillon, the newspaper magnate Henry Luce agreed and suggested that 
publishing the letters in Life Magazine would ‘dampen down this irrational and emotional 
hostility.’ Dillon enthused, ‘That’s what so good about the letter from Rockefeller. It is 
rational.’117 Dillon repeated this language to Rockefeller when he sought his approval, 
noting that the letters represented an ‘example of a constructive dialogue between business 
and the government instead of this radical, emotional stuff.’118 Publishing the letters 
encouraged the view that successful businessmen could be supportive of the administration 
and put the Treasury Department’s more fiscally conservative positions on paper as 
administration policy. 
 The published exchange was widely-praised and both Dillon and Rockefeller received 
a stream of congratulatory letters. Rockefeller continued to help the administration well 
into the fall of 1963 as the battle over the tax cut bill was held up by Senator Harry Byrd in 
the Senate Finance Committee. At the behest of Henry Ford, Rockefeller forwarded a 
committee pamphlet to his network emphasizing the ‘economics and prudent control of 
federal expenditures’ that underpinned the tax cut.119  
Nevertheless, as the administration started to look forward to the 1964 election, 
Galbraith and others reignited fears about a politically-motivated run on the dollar. 
Galbraith warned Kennedy that ‘private holders and bankers are conservatives and some of 
them cynical reactionaries.’ He explained, ‘there is a highly plausible chance of deliberate 
withdrawals by this group at the behest of American conservatives in order to embarrass 
the Administration in an election year’ and that the ‘Rockefellers, Goldwater’ and others 
would ‘relate the whole to financial irresponsibility.’ Galbraith argued that confidence, as 
Dillon encouraged for bankers and Europeans, was not enough. He maintained that the 
administration should also attack what was ultimately ‘cynical’ and politically-motivated 
‘propaganda’.120 Dillon responded that Galbraith’s letter was ‘an amazing mixture of truth 
and fantasy which is difficult to disentangle’ and that while he was right that Republicans 
might make the balance of payments an electoral issue, existing measures (including 
confidence-building steps) were the best antidote.121 
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 Whereas in the Kennedy administration, Dillon was quick to dismiss Galbraith’s 
fears, he changed his tune in the Johnson administration and began to play up the threat 
that Republicans might seek to embarrass the President in an election year.122 By March 
1964, confronted with a President who was uninterested in the economic issues at hand, 
Dillon encouraged Johnson to meet with the business groups that Kennedy and he had 
created.123 Facing a President and entourage who seemed to scorn bankers, Dillon defended 
David Rockefeller and forwarded a complimentary article to Johnson adding ‘this portrays 
the man as I know him.’124 Observers rightly celebrated Johnson for passing Kennedy’s tax 
cut legislation and for his deftness in dealing with Congress. For a time, he also reaped the 
benefits of the steps undertaken to alleviate the balance of payments deficit and to placate 
fears among dollar holders. However, the irony, as Dillon sensed, was that Johnson was, in 
fact, the embodiment of the fears that they had expressed about Kennedy, in particular 
about his lack of fiscal discipline. 
 
Dillon and Roosa’s departure from government alone does not explain the eventual collapse 
of the Bretton-Woods system and the unravelling of the ‘bargains’ that had sustained 
postwar economic cooperation. Part of the explanation for the collapse of economic 
cooperation necessarily lies in structural causes and includes the fact that Johnson’s 
domestic policies and his war spending provoked inflationary pressures. At the same time, 
as others have noted, collapse was perhaps not inevitable and ‘moral suasion’ mattered.125 
The economic problems during the Johnson administration were also important in so far as 
they signaled a changed economic perspective at the top of the executive. Thinking 
counterfactually, perhaps a President that was more interested in economics, and 
specifically in more conservative economic views such as those espoused by Dillon, might 
have made different choices. Also, if the President had continued to maintain more fiscal 
discipline, perhaps he could have continued to secure cooperation from the same actors 
that eventually attacked the Bretton-Woods system.  
The article contributes to understanding why cooperation from the private sector 
and France was possible in earlier years. It informs our understanding of Dillon’s special 
place during the Kennedy administration when he played a preeminent role internally as 
well as externally since he was welcomed in groups that subsequently proved to be 
antagonistic.  He was able to draw on friendships in the French Finance Ministry and in the 
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business world to great effect. He conveyed an image of bipartisanship that protected 
Kennedy and he shaped the administration’s message towards a more fiscally conservative 
position that placated fears among dollar holders, thus giving the administration breathing 
room in which to explore reform of the international monetary system. Finally, he had 
privileged access to Kennedy and trumped many of his colleagues, notably in the State 
Department and the CEA, in determining economic policies. 
All this changed under Johnson who was less inclined to listen to Dillon or to 
consider economic views that conflicted with his New Deal ambitions. However, Dillon’s 
impatience with Johnson was shared in France and also explains de Gaulle’s attack on the 
dollar’s role. Ultimately, in the Kennedy administration, Dillon represented a physical and 
intellectual bridge between the administration and problematic groups. Frustrating 
Kennedy’s liberal advisors, Dillon ensured that these groups’ views were represented within 
the administration. With Johnson, the bridge faltered and the connection broke. 
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Figure 2: President John F. Kennedy addresses American Bankers Association Symposium on 
Economic Growth with David Rockefeller to his left, 25 Feb. 1963. Credit: Abbie Rowe, 
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